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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Casual observation shows that cities diﬀer by their size as well as by the various types
of economic activities which they carry on. In this respect, what is probably the most
striking feature of the space-economy is that cities form a hierarchical system exhibiting
some regularity in terms of both their size and the array of goods they supply (Henderson,
1988). Another empirical regularity is that cities having the same size are more or less evenly
distributed across places (Marshall, 1989). The purpose of central place theory, a major
research topic in classical economic geography, is then to explain why such a regular urban
system exists. According to Christaller (1933), Lösch (1940) and their successors, diﬀerent
markets are arranged in a way such that a city in which a good is supplied also provides the
goods made available in a larger number of urban centers. Hence, all goods supplied in a
central place of order k =1 ,2,...are also supplied in central places of higher order (l>k ).
Furthermore, the same authors also argue that, in a featureless space, cities of equal sizes are
equally spaced. Accordingly, the urban system would be formed by a family of nested and
regular lattices, with one lattice per good, each vertex of a lattice accommodating a city that
supplies consumers situated in its vicinity. The urban hierarchical principle then holds when
the number of goods supplied in a city rises with its size, while the spacing of cities having
t h es a m es i z ei se q u a lo v e raﬂat space.
The bulk of the research on central place theory has been directed towards identifying
geometric conditions under which a superposition of regular structures is possible (the more
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1complete and elaborate study of this kind can be found in Alao et al., 1977). These consid-
erations are only interesting if they are based on microeconomic foundations. If there are
no economic forces which lead ﬁrms of diﬀerent types to cluster, it is hard to see why the
central place system would be more likely to emerge than any other conﬁguration. In this
respect, the only economic contributions we are aware of are due to Eaton and Lipsey (1982),
who develop a spatial competition model of central places, and to Quinzii and Thisse (1990),
who retain the same approach to analyze its normative aspects and characterize the socially
optimal conﬁguration of central places. Unfortunately, those papers use a partial equilibrium
setting in which consumers’ locations are exogenous.
Henderson (1974, 1988) has developed a compelling and original approach that allows him
to describe how a hierarchy of cities emerges. In each city, there is again a tension between
two forces. On the one hand, there are external economies associated with the agglomeration
of ﬁrms within a city. On the other hand, there are diseconomies generated by the need to
commute in a more or less large city. Hence, in equilibrium, each city has a well-deﬁned
size that depends on the type of ﬁrms it accommodates. As cities vary in their industrial
mix, they have diﬀerent sizes because industries diﬀer in the external economies they are able
to create. However, in this approach, cities are like ﬂoating islands because nothing is said
about city locations.
Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999) take a ﬁrst step in this direction by introducing several
industrial and diﬀerentiated goods in an NEG-like model. As the population increases, they
show that a more or less regular hierarchical central place system emerges within the economy.
In this urban system, higher-order cities provide a larger number of groups of goods. In
addition, there is two-way trade between cities because these cities supply diﬀerentiated
goods. This leads to a more intricate pattern of trade in which horizontal relations are
superimposed onto the pyramidal structure of central place theory. As expected, higher-
order cities export a larger variety of goods than lower-order cities. However, horizontal
relations between cities of the same order may be more important than trade with lower-
order cities. The urban hierarchies that emerge can be more complex than in the simple
Christaller model of central places, and indeed, often reﬂect the urban systems that actually
appear in modern economies. However, their approach is numerical, whereas our model is
analytically-solvable. Another distinguishing feature is that our economic geography is of the
putty-clay type: once they exist, cities are sticky.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to show that the urban hierarchical principle may
b ed e r i v e di na nN E G - t y p em o d e l ,i nw h i c ht h en u m b e r ,s i z e ,a n dl o c a t i o no fc i t i e sa r e
determined endogenously. Our main purpose is to focus on the size and the location of
2cities (the urban aspect) as well as the spatial distribution of each industry across cities
(the industrial aspect) when consumers/workers are free to choose where to live and for
which industry to work. To achieve our objective, we build a general equilibrium model
with monopolistically competitive markets for the industrial sectors in which the locations
of ﬁrms are interdependent. Consumers are attracted by places as they are in multipurpose
shopping models but are allowed to choose their location where they compete on the local
labor market. As in Fujita, Krugman and Mori, we retain the basic ingredients of NEG to
generate the agglomeration of ﬁrms and consumers. In particular, cities are service suppliers
to all the agricultural regions as well as to the other urban centers, the reason being that
consumers have a preference for variety whereas ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that a diﬃculty seems to be inherent to central place
theory. It is related to the integer problem encountered in club theory (Scotchmer, 2002),
but exhibits some new and additional features. Indeed, for diﬀerent lattices to be nested, it
must be that the number of cities of order k is just twice the number of cities of order k − 1
and half the number of cities of order k +1 .T h i se x p l a i n sw h yac e n t r a lp l a c ec o n ﬁguration
can emerge only for power values of 2.
2T h e m o d e l
The economy involves agricultural and industrial activities. In the agricultural sector, a
homogenous good is produced under constant returns, perfect competition and zero transport
cost; this good is taken as the numéraire. There are I(≥ 1) industrial sectors, each producing a
diﬀerentiated good under increasing returns, monopolistic competition and positive transport
costs. The economy has C(≥ 1) cities - or central places - c =1 ,2,...,Clocated at xc ∈ (0,1]
on a circumference of length 1. The location and size of cities are endogenous. Throughout
the paper, cities are described by subscripts and industries by superscripts.
There are two production factors, farmers and workers. Each farmer and worker is en-
dowed with one unit of labor. The exogenously given masses of farmers and workers are
given by 1− µ>0 and µ>0, respectively. Farmers are immobile and uniformly distributed
along the circumference with a density equal to 1 − µ. Workers can migrate freely across
cities c =1 ,2,...,C and industries i =1 ,2,...,I.L e t λi
c be the endogenous number of





c = µ. Whereas the number of industries
I is exogenous, the number of cities C as well as the distribution of workers across cities and
industries λi
c are endogenous.
The technologies are as follows. In order to produce one unit of the homogenous good, one
3farmer is needed. As the technology exhibits constant returns, the equilibrium wage equals
1 in the agricultural sector. To produce one unit of a variety of the diﬀerentiated good i,a
ﬁrm needs a ﬁxed requirement of fi > 0 workers and a marginal requirement of mi > 0 units
of the numéraire. Hence, it must be that
fini
c = λi
c for all c and i (1)
Because we allow for both spatial and sectoral mobility, there is no obvious and natural
way to model the choice process of workers. As workers show very little spatial mobility
in most industrialized countries, we assume that they, ﬁrst, choose where to live and, then,
which job to take. Given this assumption, our setting involves three stages. In the ﬁrst
one, a worker chooses a city where to live; in the second stage, she selects an industry in
which to work; in the third stage, each ﬁrm chooses prices and each consumer (= worker or
farmer) chooses her consumption of the diﬀerentiated goods, made available in each city c
by industry i, as well as her consumption of the homogenous good. As usual, we solve the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria by backward induction.
(i) In the last stage, ﬁrms select prices so as to maximize proﬁts conditional upon con-
sumers’ demands. The distribution of workers, and then the distribution of ﬁrms, across cities














with αi > 0.1 In this expression, H is the consumption of the homogenous good, Qi the
composite good associated with industry i, qi
c(v) the consumption of variety v produced by a
ﬁrm belonging to industry i and located in city c,w h e r e a sni is the mass of varieties supplied
by industry i. The parameter σi > 1 measures both the own- and cross-price elasticities of
demand for any variety of good i.










c(v)dv + H = w(x)
1This is the multi-industry extension of the utility used by Martin and Rogers (1995) and Pﬂüger (2004).
It slightly diﬀers from Krugman’s (1991) utility in that the homogenous good H is multiplicative in Krugman,
whereas it is additive here. This vastly simpliﬁes the overall analysis.
4where pi
c(v;x) is the delivered price at x of variety v of good i produced in city c,a n dw(x)
t h ei n c o m es h ee a r n sa tl o c a t i o nx.B ys y m m e t r y ,a l li-ﬁrms set up in the same city choose
the same price so that we may drop the variable v in what follows.
The maximization of utility (2) yields the following individual demand in location x for







c (x) is the common delivered price of a variety of good i produced in city c and












is the price index of good i that prevails at x. Accordingly, the indirect utility of a consumer












c is the price index of good j in city c and wc the income of a consumer residing in
city c. Because of the intersectoral mobility of workers, wages are the same across industries
within each city but they may vary across cities.
Let |xc − x| be the shortest distance between city c and location x along the circumference.
Then, τi
c (x) ≡ miτ|xc−x| > 1 is the number of units of the numéraire that a ﬁrm producing
good i and located in city c has to bear to produce and ship one unit of its output to location
x. Without loss of generality, we choose the unit of good i for mi to be equal to 1 In this case,
the parameter τ, which we call the transport rate, is a measure of the impediments to trade
any diﬀerentiated good across locations. It is assumed to be the same for all diﬀerentiated
goods.





















c (x) − τc (x)
¤
qi
c (x)dx − fiwc (5)
where λ
j






τc (x) for all c and i (6)












for all i (7)
where φi
c (x) ≡ τc (x)
1−σi
is to be interpreted as a measure of the accessibility of a consumer
at x to any variety of good i produced in city c. Hence, the sum in (7) may be interpreted
as the market accessibility of a consumer at x to the whole array of varieties provided in all
cities. This sum rises as more ﬁrms are set up close to the consumer, which in turn leads to
more competition and, therefore, to a lower price index through lower transport costs.
Workers’ wage is determined through a bidding process in which ﬁrms belonging to indus-
try i c o m p e t et oh i r et h e m .A sar e s u l t ,t h ew a g eb i l lo faﬁrm is less than (λi
c =0 )o re q u a l
to its gross proﬁts (λi
c ≥ 0). These I equations together with the total number of workers
w h oh a v ec h o s e nt ol i v ei nc allows for the determination of the shares λi
c ≥ 0 and of the
wage wc ≥ 0.





c for all c
of each city c is given. Plugging (6) into (5) and using the zero-proﬁt condition together with

































































The ﬁrst term of (8) plays the role of an agglomeration force because it expresses the
access of a worker living in c to the whole array of goods and varieties. By contrast, the
second and third terms have the nature of a dispersion force. Indeed, a more concentrated
pattern of ﬁrms, which allows for a better access, leads to more competition among ﬁrms,
thus yielding lower gross proﬁts, whence a lower wage for that worker.
6(ii) In the second stage, a worker has to choose the industry that gives her the highest
utility level, anticipating her consumption of all goods. A sectoral equilibrium in city c is
such that
V i
c ≤ V c and
¡
V i
c − V c
¢
λi
c =0 for all i (9)
Thus, when λi
c > 0,i tm u s tb et h a ta l lw o r k e r sl i v i n gi nc reach the same utility level. The
existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium are analyzed in section ??.
(iii) In the ﬁrst stage, each worker selects the city that gives her the highest utility level in
each industry, anticipating the industry for which she will work as well as her consumption.
A spatial equilibrium for industry i’s workers is then such that
V i (x) ≤ V
i and [V i (x) − V
i]λi
c =0 for all x ∈ (0,1] (10)
because workers are free to establish a new city founded at x.A su s u a li nN E Gm o d e l s ,t h e
















≡ Jc for all c (11)
where · denotes the time derivative of λi
c. The existence and stability of equilibrium are
analyzed in section ??.
3 Symmetric and asymmetric equilibria
In this section, because of the integer problem discussed in the introduction, we focus on
equilibria involving nested patterns of cities in the case where the number C of cities is a
power of 2.
Given the outcome of the third stage, we show below that the second stage has a single
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In each city, there exists a unique sectoral equilibrium.
T h ep r o o fi sg i v e ni nA p p e n d i xA .
Since the equilibrium outcome of the second and third stages is unique, we may move
directly to the ﬁrst stage. As in most NEG models, this equilibrium need not be symmetric,
unique or stable, thus making the analysis much more involved than in the other two stages.
73.1 The city-doubling point
A symmetric equilibrium with C =2 k cities, k being an integer larger than or equal to 1,
implies that all cities are located equidistantly and have the same population size. It remains
to show that the share of each industrial sector is the same across cities. By solving the
sectoral equilibrium condition V i = V for all i, the equilibrium share is uniquely determined
by
λi
c = λi ≡ ai µ
C









Thus, the share of industry i depends on the elasticity of substitution (σi)a n dt h es a l i e n c e
coeﬃcient of its output in individual preferences (αi). Because cities are identical, we may
delete the subscript c.
For (12) to be a symmetric spatial equilibrium with C cities, it must be that V i ≥ V i (x)
holds for all i and all x ∈ (0,1].
I ti ss h o w ni nA p p e n d i xBt h a tV i (x) has at most three local maxima arising at x =0 ,
x =1 /2C and x =1 /C over the interval [0,1/C],w h e r e1/C is the distance between two
adjacent cities in the symmetric conﬁguration with C cities. Therefore, for (12) to be a
spatial equilibrium, it must be that V i (0) ≥ V i (1/2C) holds for all i.
In order to work with tractable expressions, we rewrite the equilibrium condition V i (0) ≥
























































C ∈ (0,1) involves the transport rate τ and the elasticity of
substitution σi,a si nφi, but the number C of cities too.
It is readily veriﬁed that limϕi→0+ g
¡
ϕi¢
< 0 and g (1) = g0 (1) = g00 (1) = 0 >g 000 (1).
Hence, for any given value of C and for each i, the equation g
¡
ϕi¢
=0has at least one
positive solution. Let τi
2(C) be the largest of these solutions for each i =1 ,...,I,a n dτ2(C) ≡
mini τi
2(C), which we call the city-doubling point for a reason that will become clear below.
8Thus, as long as τ < τ2(C),w eh a v eV i (0) >V i (1/2C) so that there is no city at
x =1 /2C, x =3 /2C,..., x =( 2 C − 1)/2C. Conversely, when τ > τ2,t h ec o n ﬁguration
with C cities is not an equilibrium because new cities emerge at x =1 /2C, x =3 /2C,...,
x =( 2 C − 1)/2C.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 2 Let C be any even number. Then, there exists a unique threshold τ2(C) > 0
such that the equilibrium number of cities at the symmetric conﬁguration is equal to C when
the transport rate is slightly below τ2(C). Furthermore, the number of cities jumps to 2C
when the transport rate is slightly above τ2(C).
Thus, if the initial number of cities is 2k, the number of cities is successively divided
by 2 as transport costs steadily decline. In other words, decreasing transport costs leads to
a greater spatial concentration of the industrial sectors within a smaller number of central
places. Eventually, when transport costs are suﬃciently low, one city accommodates the whole
industry. This explains why τ2(C) is called a city-doubling point.
3.2 The symmetry-breaking point
Our next task is to study the conditions under which the symmetric outcome is stable. It is
shown below that the symmetric equilibrium (12) with C cities is stable if all the real parts
of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of (11) are negative. Using (18) given in Appendix





































< 0,i tm u s tb et h a t ,f o re a c hi, there exists a single positive solution τ = τi
1
to the equation h
¡
ϕi¢
=0 .L e tτ1 ≡ maxi τi
1, which we call the symmetry-breaking point.
The following result is then proven in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 Let C be any even number. Then, there exists a unique threshold τ1(C) >
0 such that the symmetric conﬁguration with C cities is stable (resp., unstable) when the
transport rate is slightly below (resp., above) τ1(C).
9From Propositions 2 and 3, we may conclude that there exists a symmetric stable equilib-
rium with C cities as long as τ belongs to (τ1(C),τ2(C)). However, for such an equilibrium to
arise, it must be that τ1(C) < τ2(C), for otherwise the symmetric conﬁguration with C cities
is never a stable equilibrium. Furthermore, as both τ1 and τ2 increase with C, it should be
clear that the economy involves a decreasing number of cities when transport costs steadily
decline.
3.3 When do city sizes diﬀer?
In order to describe the evolution of the economy with respect to transport costs, we consider
a steadily decrease in the parameter τ.W h e nτ reaches the break point τ1, the symmetric
equilibrium ceases to be stable. Two cases may then arise: either the equilibrium involves
a smaller number of cities or it retains the same number of cities but their size changes
continuously.
In the former case, it appears to be very hard, if not impossible, to characterize the
number and size of cities because we do not know how to select an equilibrium when there
are multiple equilibria. By contrast, in the latter case, the original conﬁguration can be
shown to become an alternating symmetric equilibrium, which is deﬁned as follows:
λi
2c = λ and λi
2c−1 =2 λi∗ − λ for λ ∈
£
0,2λi∗¤
and c =1 ,2,...,C/2 (15)
where λi∗ is given by (12). At such a conﬁguration, cities with diﬀerent sizes and diﬀerent
industrial mixes coexist, one small city alternating with one large city.
This conﬁguration (15) is a pitchfork bifurcation, and is stable, whereas the symmetric
conﬁguration is unstable. Following Rasband (1990), the conditions for such a bifurcation to



















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ=λi∗, τ=τ1
< 0 (16)
for all i. Alternating symmetry implies that the ﬁrst three conditions are always met. How-
ever, whether or not the last condition (16) holds depends on the parameter values. In other
10words, (16) appears to be the critical condition for the existence of an alternating symmetric
equilibrium. This is the topic covered in the section below.
4 The urban hierarchy principle
4.1 The one-industry case
We ﬁrst consider the case of one industry (I =1 ) in which large and small cities may coexist.
Hence, we may drop the superscript i. We know that the symmetric equilibrium bifurcates
when the two conditions g (ϕ)=0and ∂3dV (λ)/∂λ3¯ ¯
λ=µ/C < 0 hold. Therefore, we must
construct the boundary of the domain for which the bifurcation is a pitchfork (see (ii) in
Figure 1).
Consider the two equations ∂3dV (λ)/∂λ3¯ ¯
λ=µ/C =0and g (ϕ)=0for which there is
or there is no bifurcation. They have no explicit solutions, but we can deﬁne the implicit
functions σ = σ12 (µ) and σ = σ1 (µ). Indeed, when C =2we have µ = µ12 (ϕ) and
σ = σ12 (ϕ),w h e r e a sµ = µ1 (ϕ) and σ = σ1 (ϕ) when C =2 2,23,...As µ and σ are uniquely
determined for all relevant values of ϕ (see Appendix D), we may deﬁne the implicit functions
σ = σ12 (µ) and σ = σ1 (µ), which leads to the following.
Lemma 1 A symmetric equilibrium bifurcates (resp., breaks) at τ = τ1 if σ < σ12 (µ) (resp.
σ > σ12 (µ))f o rC =2 ,a n di fσ < σ1 (µ) (resp. σ > σ1 (µ))f o rC =2 2,23,...
We now come to the second section of the boundary and the two equations g(ϕ)=0and
h(ϕ)=0for which the symmetric equilibrium exists or not. We ﬁrst get µ = µ2 (ϕ) and
σ = σ2 (ϕ).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t( ??)w i t hai =1is always satisﬁed whenever σ > σ2 (µ)
holds. Hence, we have:
Lemma 2 Assume τ1 < τ < τ2. A stable symmetric equilibrium exists (resp., does not
exist) if σ > σ2 (µ) (resp., σ < σ2 (µ)).
Based on these two lemmas together with the fact that σ2 (µ) < σ12 (µ) < σ1 (µ),w eh a v e
proven the following. For a steadily decreasing transport cost τ, four cases may arise. (i) If
σ < σ2 (µ), a stable symmetric equilibrium never exists. (ii) If σ2 (µ) < σ < σ12 (µ),t h e r e
exists a stable symmetric equilibrium for τ1 < τ < τ2, which bifurcates at τ = τ1. (iii) If
σ12 (µ) < σ < σ1 (µ), there exists a stable symmetric equilibrium for τ1 < τ < τ2,w h i c h
breaks at τ = τ1 when C =2and bifurcates at τ = τ1 when C =2 2,23,...(iv) If σ > σ2 (µ),
11there exists a stable symmetric equilibrium for τ1 < τ < τ2, which breaks at τ = τ1.T h e
four cases are depicted in Figure 1.
Case (ii) is especially relevant to us because it provides a foundation for the urban hier-
archical principle.
Proposition 4 Consider case (ii) in which the economy has C =2 K+1 cities located equidis-
tantly on the circumference, K being an integer. Then, for k = K,K − 1,...,1, the evo-
lutionary process associated with a steadily falling transport rate τ is given by the repeti-




< τ < τ1
¡
2k+1¢
;( b )2k-symmetric equilibrium for τ1
¡
2k¢




agglomerated equilibrium for τ2 (1) < τ < τ1 (2); and (d) fully agglomerated equilibrium for
0 < τ < τ2 (1).
This pattern corresponds to the one investigated in central place theory à la Christaller-
Lösch. What distinguishes our approach from the existing contributions is the fact that ﬁrms’
and workers’ locations are related here through a full-ﬂedged micro-economic model.
Case (i) resembles to what is called the ‘no-black-hole’ condition in NEG: the manufactur-
ing share µ is large and the elasticity of substitution σ low. However, there is no-black-hole
condition here because, in our setting, the farming population is uniformly distributed along
the circumference. It can readily be veriﬁed that full agglomeration (i.e. the black hole) is
never a stable equilibrium for suﬃciently large τ even though µ is large and close to 1 and/or
σ is small and close to 1. The no-black-hole condition holds only if the population of farmers
is atomistically distributed across cities. Note that the largest possible number of cities, as
well as their locations, is predetermined in the case of an atomistic distribution of farmers in
Krugman (1993), whereas it is endogenously determined in our case. Since case (i) does not
satisfy the symmetric equilibrium condition, a stable equilibrium is necessarily asymmetric,
involving some large and small cities. Unfortunately, such asymmetric equilibria are analyt-
ically intractable and do not agree with the urban hierarchical principle of equally-spaced,
equal-size cities.
Case (iv) is the opposite to case (i) in that the manufacturing share µ is small and the
elasticity of substitution σ is high, so that the symmetric equilibrium is likely to be stable.
When the transport cost τ falls below the threshold τ1, the symmetric equilibrium breaks
and multiple equilibria may emerge. There is a tomahawk bifurcation, which also appears
in Krugman (1991).2 The multiplicity of equilibria prevents us to determine which stable
2When µ = µ2 (σ) or µ = µ22 (σ), the symmetric equilibrium also breaks but there is no multiplicity of
equilibria (Ottaviano et al., 2002).
12equilibrium is selected after the symmetry breaks. For those reasons, we do not further
investigate this case.
Finally, case (iii) lies between cases (ii) and (iv), we focus only on case (ii) and assume
σ2 (µ) < σ < σ12 (µ) (17)
which is the shaded area in Figure 1. Denote τ1 and τ2 by τ1 (C) and τ2 (C) respectively






> 0 for h =1 ,2
for all relevant ranges of σ, µ and C.T h i s c o n ﬁrms standard results in NEG for which
symmetry is a stable outcome once τ is large, σ is large, or µ is small.
4.2 The multi-industry case
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fI>1 industries. As in the foregoing section, for a symmetric equilibrium
to exist, we assume
σ1 (µ) < σi < σ12 (µ)
When C =2 K+1 cities are located equidistantly on the circumference, Proposition 2 may
be easily extended to describe the impact of a falling transport cost τ on the way the urban
system is organized.
The equilibrium path starts from iteration 0 and involves the repetition of I+1 types of
equilibria.
(0) 2K+1-symmetric equilibrium for τ1
¡
2K¢
< τ < τ2
¡
2K+1¢
,w h e r ea l l2K+1 cities have
all industries: all industries are dispersed through the largest possible number of cities because
transport costs are very large.
For k = K,K − 1,...,1,
(1) 2k+1-alternating symmetric equilibrium for τ < τ1
¡
2k+1¢
,w h e r ea l l2k+1 cities have
all industries;
(2) 2k+1-alternating symmetric equilibrium with an agglomeration of order 1,w h e r e2k
cities have all industries and whereas 2k cities have I − 1 industries;
(3) 2k+1-alternating symmetric equilibrium with an agglomeration of order 2,w h e r e2k
cities have all industries and whereas 2k cities have I − 2 industries;
. . .




,w h e r e2k cities have all industries and another 2k cities have 1 industry: as the
13transport cost decreases, half of the cities accommodate a number of industries that steadily
decreases to one;
(I+1) 2k-symmetric equilibrium for τ1
¡
2k¢
< τ < τ2
¡
2k¢
, where the number of cities is
divided by two but all 2k cities have all industries: as the transport cost falls suﬃciently, half
the cities have disappeared.
Repeating this process from (1)t o( I+1) K t i m e s ,w em u s te n du pw i t ha nu r b a nc o n ﬁgu-
ration in which at most two cities are active:
(IK+K+1)f o rτ < τ1 (2), the equilibrium involves one city having all industries as well
as a second city has I − 1 industries;
(IK+K+2) the equilibrium involves one city accommodating all industries whereas a
second city has I − 2 industries;
. . .
(IK+K+I) the equilibrium has one city with all industries and a second city with a
single industry;
(IK+K+I+1)f o r0 < τ < τ2(1), all industries are agglomerated within a single city: as
transport costs suﬃciently fall, the number of cities steadily declines and full agglomeration
arises in a single city as in standard two-region NEG models .
In sum, we have identiﬁed four types of equilibria: alternating symmetry (1), alternating
symmetry that obey the urban hierarchical principle (2)-(I)a n d( IK+K+1)-(IK+2K),
full symmetry (0)a n d( I+1), and full agglomeration (IK+2K+1). In steps (2)-(I)a n d
(IK+K+1)-(IK+2K), industries get concentrated within a smaller number of cities. More
precisely, the number of industries decreases, ﬁrst, in half of the cities and, then, the number
of cities decreases by one half. Eventually, the number of cities fall and, when transport costs
are suﬃciently low, all industries are agglomerated in a single city, thus conﬁrming one of the
main results of NEG. Such equilibria with three industries are represented in Figure 3: full
symmetry (I, IV and VII), the urban hierarchical principle (II, III, V, VI, VIII and XI) and
full agglomeration (X). What makes our analysis new and original is the result that central
places are endogenous and arise when transport costs take intermediate values. In addition,
the transition from full dispersion to full agglomeration is progressive in our setting.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have considered a general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive markets,
in which urban centers are service suppliers to all the agricultural regions as well as to the
14other urban centers. We have retained the forward and backward linkages of NEG to generate
the agglomeration of ﬁrms and workers in cities. Our main result is that central places arise
endogenously when transport costs take intermediate values.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Without loss of generality, we may assume that all industries are active in city c; otherwise
we restrict ourselves to set of active industries.
Diﬀerentiation of V i





































=0 ∀ i 6= j
which means that the Jacobian matrix of the utility is negative deﬁnite. It then follows from
Rosen (1965, Theorem 8) that (??) always has a unique sectoral equilibrium in each city c.
B Proof outline of argmaxV i (x)=0or 1/2C
In symmetric equilibrium λi
c = aiµ/C for all c and i, the indirect utility of a worker in
industry i at location x is given by
V i (x)=
αiaiA1

































































z4 +2 8 z3 +3 8 z2 +2 8 z +1
¢
− 12z (z +1 )
3 logz
i
where A2 > 0 and z ≡
¡
φi¢2x−1/C. Examining d4V i (x)/dx4, we can show that d3V i (x)/dx3
is minimized at x =0or 1/2C for x ∈ [0,1/2C]. We can then show d3V i (0)/dx3 > 0 and
d3V i (1/2C)/dx3 > 0, and hence d3V i (x)/dx3 > 0 for x ∈ [0,1/2C]. We can also show








follows that V i (x) is convex in the interval of [0,1/2C].
C Proof of Lemma 3
(i) From Bellman (1970, pp.242-243), the real parts of eigenvalues of the circulant Jacobian











for c =1 ,2,...,C





































The C-symmetric equilibrium in industry i is stable if (18) is negative for all c =1 ,2,...,C.
It is straightforward that
∂V i (c/C)
∂λC




























c in (18) is evaluated by plugging the RHS of this expression. It is readily shown
that the denominator of zi
c is positive, the numerators of zi
2c and zi
2c−1 are increasing (resp.




C/2 the largest, and hence the symmetry breaking condition is reduced to maxi zi
C/2 =0 ,
or equivalently, τ = τ1 (C). Hence, the stability condition is given by τ > τ1 (C),a n dt h e
instability condition is given by τ < τ1 (C).
16D Implicit functions of the boundaries




µ = e µ12 (ϕ)=
(1+ϕ)2[3−3ϕ2+(1+4ϕ+ϕ2)logϕ]
3(1−ϕ2)(1+ϕ)2+(1+8ϕ+4ϕ2+12ϕ3−ϕ4)logϕ







µ = e µ1 (ϕ)=
(1+ϕ)2[3−3ϕ2+(1+4ϕ+ϕ2)logϕ]
3(1−ϕ2)(1+ϕ)2+(1+ϕ2)(1+10ϕ+ϕ2)logϕ
σ = e σ1 (ϕ)=
4ϕ[(1−ϕ)(1+10ϕ+ϕ2)+6ϕ(1+ϕ)logϕ]
(1−ϕ)(3+16ϕ+58ϕ2+16ϕ3+3ϕ4)+(1+ϕ)(1+6ϕ+34ϕ2+6ϕ3+ϕ4)logϕ













































σ = e σ2 (ϕ)=B1
B2
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19Figure 1:  Bifurcation domain (ii) in Proposition 2
















(iii)Figure 2:  Evolutionary process for transport cost changes
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Figure 3:  Evolution of three industries
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